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It’s a seemingly average June day at the Natanz uranium enrichment 
facility in Esfahan, Iran. All the dials and computer-generated data point 
to standard operation of the near 5,000 centrifuges.1 But, as with many 
other days throughout the 2009 season, today is replete with setbacks, 
errors, and chronic fatigue failures of Iran’s struggling cold-war era IR-1 
enrichment devices.2 A new wave of firings commences, and a state of 
pandemonium envelops the facility. Discord and mistrust run through-
out Iran’s nuclear ranks, along with fears of intrusion elsewhere in the 
nation’s cyber infrastructure.3 With so many failures, it’s no wonder why 
the bosses point fingers at anyone who might be behind the destruction of 
the centrifuges. Unbeknownst to the facility operators, today isn’t busi-
1. Centrifuges are large cylindrical devices comprised of smaller tubes that spin 
at speeds near 1,000 MHz to enrich nuclear isotopes. Each centrifuge is arranged 
in a series known as cascades, each varying in size but usually comprised of 164 
linked centrifuges. Lindsay, 2013, 380.
2. This chronic fatigue, as opposed to catastrophic failure, was specially 
implemented to create chaos within the Iranian facility, while keeping likelihood 
of detection to a minimum. A standard catastrophic-failure attack would have 
been caught and neutralized almost immediately, despite the man-in-the-
middle attack described later.
3. Kello, 2013, 23.
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ness as usual at the struggling nuclear facility. At this moment, Natanz is 
the target of a thoroughly planned bilateral cyberattack over three years 
in the making.4
The plans for this unconventional strike hatched amid growing tensions 
between Middle Eastern Israeli and Palestinian actors at a crucial stage 
in the long fought cat-and-mouse game to prevent Iran from attaining 
nuclear armament capabilities. In 2006, under the purview of United 
States President George W. Bush, Operation Olympic Games began. This 
covert campaign ushered in a new phase of the struggle to keep Iran at 
bay without devolving the region into further turmoil. Since 1957, a pre-
carious situation enveloped the U.S. and Iran as the Iranian state sought 
to acquire nuclear weapons, while the U.S. and its supporters labored to 
undermine these attempts. In the earliest days of this feud, then-ally 
Iran signed a civil nuclear agreement as part of the U.S. Atoms for Peace 
program.5 Then, in 1968, Iran signed the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons Treaty (NPT), but, in 1979, with the growth of the Islamic 
Revolution, U.S.-Iranian relations were severed. Over the subsequent 
two decades, despite continued input from Chinese, North Korean, and 
Pakistani experts, U.S. political efforts kept Iranian nuclear development 
to a minimum. By 2003, however, despite its prior promise to the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran’s capabilities had advanced 
rapidly. When staunch conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad succeeded 
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in 2005, Bush demanded that the 
U.N. Security Council impose strict sanctions on the import and export of 
sensitive nuclear material. By 2006, these sanctions were still in effect, 
but the enrichment process was also still grinding along, forcing Presi-
dent Bush to pursue alternative measures to keep Iran at bay.
Destroying Iran’s development infrastructure could have neutralized 
their progress. And a standard airstrike might have accomplished this 
goal, if it weren’t for Iran’s efforts to disperse their system throughout the 
country and away from Israeli borders. In addition, the newest facility at 
Natanz was largely housed in underground bunkers - areas that were dif-
ficult to attack at the time. Nonetheless, a strike would have been feasible. 
In fact, earlier in the year, Israel requested the necessary bunker-busting 
munitions from the U.S., a request that Bush emphatically rejected. And, 
as shown by an Israeli attack on a Syrian nuclear enrichment plant during 
4. Although some contest use of the term cyberattack, I side with Rid, Liff, and 
Junio’s determination that the Stuxnet malware strain does in fact fit the criteria.
5. NPR, 2018.
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Operation Orchard, a kinetic strike was still within reason. However, the 
potential blowback could have been immense, and a retributive strike by 
the Iranians against Israel would have proven disastrous. These circum-
stances, combined with U.S. involvement in two unpopular wars in Iraq 
and Pakistan, galvanized public opinion against another “unwinnable 
war.”6 In November 2007, commencing a tactical strike became all but 
possible. Despite intelligence agencies’ knowledge to the contrary, the 
widely reported U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Tehran 
had not restarted its nuclear program after 2003.7 Regardless, Israel still 
sought plans to enact a conventional strike. The outlook was dismal, but 
in its final effort to keep Israel at bay, and Iran behind schedule, the U.S. 
had another strategy.
Enter Operation Olympic Games: a covert cyber campaign intended to 
weaponize a strain of malware to counter the progress of Iranian nuclear 
pursuits. Already two years in the making, the program was fast-tracked 
by former President Barack Obama after its initial introduction into the 
wild in mid-2008. This paper aims to address whether or not the Stuxnet 
worm cyberattack was ethically acceptable. This analysis will apply 
metrics of Just War Theory (JWT), as popularized by the United Nations 
Charter and Geneva Conventions and thoroughly explored by Michael 
Walzer. First, I will utilize the framework of jus ad bellum to uncover 
whether the cyberwar itself was just. More precisely, I apply the legalist 
paradigm (LP) to assess whether the cause of the war was just. Next, I 
explore the concept of jus in bello to evaluate whether the U.S. fought this 
cyberwar justly, with special focus on whether the combatants followed 
the “laws of war.” Note that these two elements of JWT are independent; 
one can fight a just war unjustly and vice versa.
A cyber conflict is described as an offensive cyberattack for political or 
strategic purposes and encompasses the responses to the attack as well.8 
Though cyberweapons are not overtly violent and thus do not fit the stan-
dard definition of interstate conflict, they have the potential to inflict 
serious harm and to threaten society.9 Lucas Kello, Director of the Centre 
6. This phrase represented the attitude that many had towards the Vietnam War, 
from the U.S. perspective. For more information, see the following article from 
the Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/vietnam-the-history-
unwinnable-war-1945-1975.   
7. Raas, 2007, 7-33.
8. Rid, 2012.
9.  Kello, 2013, 8.
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for Technology and Global Affairs at Oxford University,10 divides cyber-
attacks into their direct and indirect consequences, concluding that, by 
definition, a cyberattack must “produce significant physical destruction 
or loss of life.”11 In fact, according to Timothy Junio, a former cyberwar-
fare strategist for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, non-lethal cyberattacks have the potential to be 
more expensive and damaging than traditional warfare.12 An important 
factor here is the cost and probability of cyber war in relation to other con-
ventional forms of conflict.13 So, while the 2007 DDoS attacks on Estonia 
do not qualify as cyberwarfare, the Stuxnet cyberweapon and its usage 
does.14 Thus, despite rampant “threat inflation” arguments espoused by 
skeptics like Thomas Rid, a leading international cybersecurity expert, 
the cyber threat posed by the Stuxnet worm and other cyberweapons 
have the potential to qualify as acts of war and, as such, ought to be taken 
seriously.15
Jus ad Bellum
Mark Amstutz separates the concept of jus ad bellum into six necessary cri-
teria used for generalizing whether a conflict is just: just cause, competent 
authority, right intention, limited objectives, last resort, and reasonable 
hope of success.16 With just cause criteria, Amstutz indicates that the only 
legitimate justification for war is to deter aggression, defend against 
unjust attack, or right a grievous wrong.17 Focusing on the deterrence 
prong, we reach our first ethical and definitional dilemma. Deterrence 
bifurcates into two forms of just and unjust violence—preemptive attacks 
and preventative attacks. First, preemptive attacks require empirically 
demonstrable imminent danger. In the case of Stuxnet, only speculation 
abounds, and this is not enough to meet the stringent requirements for 
10. https://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/academic-staff/lucas-kello.html.
11. Ibid, 20.
12. Junio, 2013, 126.
13. Ibid, 127.
14. DDoS, or Distributed Denial of Service, is a method for enlisting “zombie” 
machines to send bogus requests intended to overwhelm a server to block 
legitimate traffic from routing appropriately. For a more in-depth report on the 
Estonian case see Kello, 2013, 24-25.
15. Rid, 2012.
16. Amstutz, 2013, 70.
17. Ibid, 141.
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a preemptive attack.18 This is because JWT seeks to limit the occasions 
for war, and allowing for a country to enact a preemptive strike to stall a 
forecasted future attack could open Pandora’s box in the realm of interna-
tional relations. The requisite information needed to enact a preemptive 
strike is incredibly specific and explicit, and Stuxnet does not meet this 
burden of proof, thus failing as a preemptive strike.
Prevention, the second angle to deterrence of aggression, is rooted in 
whether Iran would have soon achieved nuclear supremacy and what 
Tehran would have done with that capacity. As with all preventative 
strikes, we cannot know for sure what Iran would have done if given 
the chance to employ nuclear weapons, but, by 2012, Iran still had not 
“broken out” of the NPT. Even today, Iran agrees to remove most of its 
enriched uranium.19 To echo Amstutz, “must a country wait until a rogue 
state launches a ballistic missile tipped with a WMD before it can legit-
imately attack that state?”20 Here, we are in a unique position to look 
back on the Stuxnet operation with knowledge of the damage that it 
posed. Given U.S. and Israeli accounts, this was a preventative strike to 
ensure that the unstable Iranian government didn’t have the capacity to 
strike at will in the future. Looking at Michael Walzer’s criteria for first 
strikes, we see that “sufficient threat” is necessary. This is satisfied when 
the following are present: a manifest intent to injure, active prepara-
tion that establishes a positive danger, and a situation in which waiting 
greatly magnifies the risk.21 But the difficulty here is whether Iran estab-
lished intent. From the logical perspective, if Iran did not plan to use the 
enriched uranium for nuclear devices, then Tehran would likely abide 
by the NPT to avoid further sanctions. On the other hand, Iran may have 
planned to use the nuclear weapons as a deterrent force against Israel and 
the U.S. However, this preventative framework usually applies to a man-
ifest intent to injure, further complicating the matter because Israel and 
the U.S. indicated no intent to use nuclear force. We cannot assume that 
imminent danger preceded the Stuxnet attack, nor that Iran would have 
used nuclear weapons if given the chance. As a result, just cause criteria 
rejects this act of aggression as morally impermissible, because neither 
preemption nor prevention established a manifest intent to injure.
18. Ibid, 149.
19. CNN, 2018.
20. Amstutz, 2013, 153.
21. Walzer, 2015, 81.
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The question of competent authority is often difficult in the cyberspace 
because of the attribution problem, but, in this scenario, the challenge is 
somewhat ambiguous. Assuming the U.S. and Israeli governments were 
behind this attack, and that the attacks were not committed by rogue 
developers, it is clearly an action authorized by a legitimate govern-
ment.22 With conventional acts of warfare, attribution is relatively simple; 
it is easy to tell whose troops march on your borders or which nation’s 
planes drop bombs, but this type of delineation is far more challenging 
with Stuxnet. Cyberconflict blurs the lines of attribution, and, in this case, 
no government has yet claimed the acts of war as their own.23 This raises 
the question of whether authorization can be given without appropriate 
attribution. In the past, we have seen terrorist groups fight unjust wars 
because they act outside of the sphere of governmental authority. But, 
never have we seen a government acting authoritatively without attri-
bution of actions as their own. In short, because of today’s underlying 
internet architecture, and despite cutting-edge forensic analysis, it is 
very difficult to determine who committed a technological action, why 
they did it, and what the result was.24 Attribution is critical to deterrence 
(the concept that one can deter another from acting for fear of reprisal). 
It is difficult to retaliate against an unidentified enemy.25 To this end, the 
authority of an unattributed attack is largely still an open topic in the 
field of cyberwarfare. I would argue more attention ought to be paid to 
it lest former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s ominous “cyber Pearl 
Harbor” come to fruition.26
Regarding right intention (seeks to restore a just peace), limited objec-
tives (encompasses the obvious, combined with proportionality), last 
resort (exhaustion of peaceful means), and reasonable hope of success, 
the case is relatively straightforward. Despite a constant state of unrest 
22. John Stone pursues this argument in more detail in his piece, “Cyber War Will 
Take Place!” and every other article cited in this piece attributes the attack to the 
United States and Israel.
23. While most of the literature defends the thought that Stuxnet was created 
for and by the United States and Israel, there are defensible cases made to the 
contrary. One such case by Jeffrey Carr in Forbes, points the finger at a Finnish-
Chinese collaboration. https://www.forbes.com/sites/firewall/2010/12/14/stuxnets-
finnish-chinese-connection/#30898f062b58.
24. Clark, 2010, 25-30.
25. Ibid.
26. Kushner, 2013, 4.
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among nations in the Middle East for many decades, Stuxnet sought to 
increase the amount of time that the United Nations had to debate various 
policies and grant Iran an appropriate window to respond to them. So, 
while a just peace was not present to begin with, this act of war sought 
to precipitate it more rapidly than conventional arms might, by keeping 
Iran from obtaining a nuclear football. While delaying Iranian procure-
ment of nuclear capability is somewhat nebulous, this is all that one can 
afford short of invading the nation or taking even more drastic measures. 
An unstable regime like Iran tends toward the procurement of nuclear 
armaments, and thus war can only delay or exacerbate the process. Diplo-
macy can stem the flow of development, but the UN needed more time to 
debate and implement austerity measures.27 Finally, last resort is rather 
interesting, because this act of war served as a relatively mellow means of 
pursuing peace without resorting to conventional bloody warfare. While 
there was potential for reprisal by a conventional Iranian force, this was 
not likely nor has it ever transpired. By this account, Stuxnet sought to 
increase the number of peaceful means of diplomatic negotiation before 
a kinetic strike and aggressive conflict were necessary. Thus, this action 
had a reasonable hope of success in enabling communicative parties to 
remain at the negotiating table longer, an unlikely feat had Iran reached 
nuclear supremacy or Israel authorized preemptive strikes.
Drawing on each of these six essential prongs of the jus ad bellum 
approach to JWT, we have a clear picture painting the U.S.-Israeli cyber-
war as morally acceptable on five counts-the one exception being it 
did not establish just cause. Insofar as Iran would have used its nuclear 
armaments to harm the Israeli people and throw the rest of the region 
into turmoil, this cyberweapon could have provided just cause for a com-
petent authority as evidenced by right intention, limited objectives, and 
a reasonable hope of success. But Iran’s intentions were not empirically 
demonstrable, no matter how conclusive the speculation appears. As 
a result, this cyber conflict, though an unjust war, still could have been 
justly fought. As such, we now must look at the specifics of what trans-
pired as it relates to the ethical frameworks of JWT.
27. I assess proportionality more thoroughly in the next section’s discussion of jus 
in bello. 
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Jus in Bello
We now hone in on discrimination and proportionality in the scope of the 
unjust cyberwar. Discrimination dictates that a nation may apply military 
force only against the political leadership and military forces of a state,28 
and the attack must avoid both civilian harm and minimize collateral 
damage at all costs. To assess whether this was the case, we must look 
deeper into the inner workings of Stuxnet: a dual warhead comprised 
of what is known as a “man-in-the-middle” attack29 and the technical 
payload of the malware. The latter was a series of system rootkit command 
and control (C2) calls issued to the Programmable Logic Controllers 
(PLC), which monitored and managed the complicated centrifuges.30 Tra-
ditional malware travels through networks and the internet, but, in an 
added level of security, the Natanz nuclear center was contained within an 
“air-gaped” network. This means that, barring any security mishaps or 
human error, there is no communication from within the Natanz network 
to the world surrounding it. This posed a problem for the designers of the 
malware, so they utilized a “zero-day” exploit in LNK files to provide 
auto-execution capabilities and transferred them through flash-drives 
used by unwitting Iranian contractors. Once the malware bridged the air-
gap, it continued to spread through the system.
Stuxnet is a malware strain known as a worm because it aggressively 
replicates itself to spread throughout a network. In the process of doing 
this, the malware constantly logged information about the network it was 
exploring and searched for very specific scenarios before it unleashed 
its full potential. Once the worm worked its way into the desired piece of 
equipment, it began an indefinite two-month cycle of promoting chronic 
fatigue in specific models of IR-1 uranium enrichment devices.31 If the 
malware hadn’t reached its destination, or found a new piece of machin-
28. Amstutz, 2013.
29. These are eerily similar to bank heist scenes in which crooks loop doctored 
footage on the security guard’s screens. Here, the developers of Stuxnet tricked 
the properly functioning monitoring systems to read standard output regardless 
of what was really happening within the device.
30. See Junio, 2013, 130 for a more concrete discussion of command and control 
issues as they arise within the scope of cyber space.
31. Once a SIMATIC device is found and the man-in-the-middle attack is 
underway, Stuxnet speeds up the IR-1 centrifuge to 1410 MHz (outside of its 
operating capacity) for 15 minutes. Then, it returns to regular 1064 MHz for 27 
days, then down to 2 Hz (too slow to enrich uranium) for 50 minutes, then back 
to standard 1064 MHz for 27 days, and the process loops.
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ery to jump to after two weeks, it terminated immediately. Among other 
attempts to limit propagation and discriminate its targets, every time the 
malware ran on a new device, it ensured that the current date was before 
June 24, 2012, apparently the termination date of the mission.32
At some point during the process of propagating through Natanz’s air-
gaped network, the pernicious code spread onto an unwitting engineer’s 
personal computer. When she took said computer home and connected 
it to the internet, in a matter of moments, Stuxnet was free. After a short 
stint in Iran, the malware made its way onto systems in over 150 countries 
and upwards of 100,000 hosts, including the systems of Chevron Corpo-
ration in the U.S.33 What is incredible about the spread of this malware is 
that it did nothing to the civilian devices it encountered, save reducing 
network bandwidth. In a remarkable showing of discriminative execu-
tion, this piece of malware, which intended to wreak havoc on enemy 
infrastructure, was robust enough to restrain itself in an uncontained 
environment. Double effect mandates that a particular action is morally 
acceptable given the act is good, the direct effect is morally acceptable, 
the actor’s intention is good, and the good effect is sufficiently good.34 This 
restraint on collateral damage proves to be a simple moral calculus for 
Stuxnet, despite its introduction onto 100,000 civilian devices, because of 
the adept discrimination practiced by the malware and its human devel-
opers.
The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) espoused by Walzer, and critiqued by 
philosopher Henry Sidgwick, requires that the harm done must not be out 
of proportion to the good achieved. The significant additional condition 
to this framework is the double intention condition, in which the intent 
of the actor weighs heavily on the moral standing of the action itself. For 
example, if one desired to bomb a city with the intent of killing civilians 
to demoralize an enemy, he is morally abhorrent. If the same person 
commits the same bombing campaign, but with the intent of killing mil-
itary targets, knowing that civilians will be killed in the process, he is 
morally admirable so long as he attempts to reduce the number of civilian 
deaths.35 Applying this to Stuxnet, we see a noble attempt to plan for con-
tingencies and protect innocent civilians from the destructive malware 
that the developers built. In doing so, we can assume that the developers 
32. Kello, 16-18.
33. Symantec, 2011, 5.
34. Walzer, 2015, 153-156.
35. Walzer, 2015.
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had no intent to hurt civilians and thus upheld DDE and double intention.
Jus in bello provides a framework for assessing the moral standing of a 
war-time action. In the case of Stuxnet and its clear intent to protect 
civilians, plan for contingencies, avoid damaging anyone other than the 
enemy, and sustain proportionality, we see jus in bello exemplified. This 
is a demonstrable success in the realm of DDE and discrimination, and it 
provides insight into a well-fought cyberwar.
Conclusion
In parsing the evidence laid bare by the divulgence of the Stuxnet cyber-
attack and mapping it onto Just War Theory’s jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, we obtain a full picture of the first cyberweapon ever reported and 
likely the first case of genuine cyberwarfare in history. I used JWT because 
it presents the most cohesive tradition of military ethics in use today, 
and it seeks to limit the occasions for war, perhaps, more than any other 
moral framework. I make the case that the cyberwar was, in fact, morally 
praiseworthy in how it kept human lives off the battlefield and worked to 
effectively discriminate the destruction of enemy systems while avoiding 
wreaking havoc on civilian systems. But, the war itself was unjust because 
the aggressor did not prove just cause, in large part because JWT requires 
the preponderance of material evidence. In assessing the efficacy of this 
cyberwar, we can be none too wary of the precedent set by endorsing or 
critiquing it. After all, reprisals may have already happened against the 
U.S. or Israel for its implied part in the cyberconflict despite the attribution 
problem. Future research needs to dive deeper into the moral implications 
of world-wide attack vectors without a standard ability to attribute to 
the perpetrator and what that means for competent authority in jus ad 
bellum. Also, we do not know the extent to which cyberwarfare preserves 
or damages the lives of civilians. I echo prior writers who note that we 
may fight the next major war in cyberspace. As a result, Stuxnet could 
be only the mildest weaponized malware variant, equivalent to a musket 
prior to the advent of the Gatling gun. Thus, despite the concession that 
Stuxnet was an unjust war fought justly, we ought to tread lightly in how 
we relate Just War Theory to future cases of cyberwarfare.
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